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Philip Morris

Defending Smokers Rights Forest

Date: 1983 (est.)
Length: 2 pages
2501021528-2501021529
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Attachment
2501021486/2501021725
Area
CORPORATE AFFAIRS/EU ARCHIVE
Type
REPT, REPORT, OTHER
Litigation
Stmn/Produced
Site
E26
Master ID
2501021486/1725
Related Documents:
Named Organization
Action on Alcohol Abuse
Ash, Action on Smoking & Health
British Airways
British Rail
Forest
Request
Stmn/Rl-002
Stmn/R1-048
Author (Organization)
Forest
Date Loaded
05 Jun 1998
UCSF Legacy ID
sex19e00

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Page 1: sex19e00 Log in for more options!
3.4 DEFENDIWG SMOKERS' RIGHTS FOREST l. FOREST puts the case for smokers' freedom to government, the mass media and the general public. It also defends the rights of non-smokers. Two apparently conflicting interests are reconciled by promoting the values of mutual courtesy and tolerance and by campaigning for sensible and representative restrictions on smoking in public areas. This theme is developed in the Smoking Charter and is underscored by opinion survey findings on freedom to smoke issues. 2. The campaign theme is not the promotion of one section's interest per se - i.e. the smoker - but the promotion of personal liberty. The FOREST campaign is part of the overall defence of the free market economy where consumers are sovereign, competing entrepreneurs satisy their demands and State interference is resisted. 3. Success or failure is not measured in the quantity of tobacco sold or in the number of smokers. It is reflected in the absence of coercive pressures on the smoker. 4. FOREST identifies three main categories of coercive pressure: (i) Discriminatory taxation (ii) Excessive restrictions or bans on public smoking (iii) Attitude moulding by State agencies under the guise of health education. 5. FOREST thus becomes a rallying point for disaffected smokers and others concerned at State interference with personal liberty. It recruits individual subscribers and aims to develop groups of area activists. Accordingly, it is the voice first of the concerned citizen, and secondly of the consumer of tobacco. It is not the voice of the manufacturer though naturaT-ere will be considerable identity of fnterests. 6. In order to counter the work of the anti-smoking movement, tax-funded as it is, FOREST goes fundraising to the Industry. Accusations from adversaries of being "industry funded" or "industry sponsored" are inevitable. They can be count- ered (a) by stressing the antis' dependence on the tax payer and (b) by emphasising that FOREST takes the initiative of going to the industry for support and not vice versa. 7. An "arms length" relationship with manufacturers must be maintained to mutual benefit. FOREST cannot speak for manufacturers'specific interests and if it did its wider libertarian and/or consumer themes would be confused. 8. In four years some progress has been achieved in countering the anti-smoking lobby and defending (if not extending) smokers' rights. But the antis have had a decade of unopposed activity behind them and FOREST is entering the arena late in the day. Whether this progress is merely slowing down their rate of success or actually blocking their path is open to question. But, if as was indicated at Winnipeg, the anti-smoking movement shifts its ground from the relatively moderate field of medical research to the more militant ground of political confrontation, then FOREST comes into its own as a rival political group which will overtly fight the antis and which can claim widespread public sympathy.
Page 2: sex19e00 Log in for more options!
2 9. ACTION (i) For the media, FOREST is an"alternative voice" on smoking issues. Radio and TV producers naturally prefer a two-sided debate between pros and antis which may retain listeners attention to an unchallenged monologue. Spokesmen have been provided for interviews, debates and discussions. and phone-ins throughout the U.K. Had FOREST not existed such programmes would have been the preserve of the antis. 1983 Don't Smoke Day was wrecked by FOREST's National Busybodies Week Campaign. The antis lost the unchallenged coverage they had expected. Newspapers, slow at first to treat FOREST as a credible alternative voice on tobacco are now increasingly taking news stories though progress has still to be made in winning the "instant comment" status that ASH enjoys. (ii) Action to resist bans on public smoking have met with success - e.g. British Rail, Edinburgh's buses, London Underground, British Airways - and much more work will be done in this area, confident as we are from recent public opinion polls that public support can be claimed. (iii) Government Ministers and politicians in the U.K. are receptive to the FOREST message and will receive deputations and listen to representations. Pressure, directly or indirectly, is beginning to work, e.g. in curbing ASH's funding. (iv) The potential for development of a substantial network of subscribers and activists exists but two obstacles remain : (a) Britain is a society of non-joiners; smokers are notoriously passive in defending their passtime, probably as a result of their "inevitability complex"; (b) the recruitment of articulate activists who can be relied on to speak to a party line on controversial Issues must be treated with care if hostages to fortune are not given to the antis. 10. FOREST stresses the importance of the "domino effectu - restrictions on tobacco leading to restrictions on other areas of personal choice. As this develops,e.g. the emergence of Action on Alcohol Abuse - FOREST naturally will seek to counter the activies of these groups to illustrate its general concern for personal liberty rather than its specific defence of the smoking interest.

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